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Those crazy kids, Vitalik Buterin and Jason Teusch, over at the University of Chicago's Department of Computer Science, have come up with an alternate model for initial cryptocurrency offerings. This academic paper argues for new structures for ICOs that allow "all" buyers a place in line when it comes to first purchasing cryptocurrency that they say will bring more stability into the crypto market. This addresses what they call Buterin's Delima. All sounds good! We wish them speedy recoveries from their future drive-by shooting wounds.
Proposition. No token crowdsale satisfies that both:
(i) a fixed amount of currency buys at least a fixed fraction of the total
tokens, and
(ii) everyone can participate.
Proof. If one unit of currency purchases at least p fraction of the tokens, then the total sale revenue cannot exceed 1/p. Clearly any fixed valuation scheme cannot guarantee universal participation, however, we shall construct a crowdsale protocol such that, if each participant specifies a desired purchase quantity at each valuation, then the
ultimate token cost to percentage ratio satisfies all buyers (with respect to both valuation and participation).
Proposition. No token crowdsale satisfies that both:
(i) a fixed amount of currency buys at least a fixed fraction of the total
tokens, and
(ii) everyone can participate.
Proof. If one unit of currency purchases at least p fraction of the tokens, then the total sale revenue cannot exceed 1/p. Clearly any fixed valuation scheme cannot guarantee universal participation, however, we shall construct a crowdsale protocol such that, if each participant specifies a desired purchase quantity at each valuation, then the
ultimate token cost to percentage ratio satisfies all buyers (with respect to both valuation and participation).